created to be a check and balance to the perceived threat of the standing Regular Army, to continue the domestic support of the state militia systems, 4 and to be a strategic reserve for times of national emergency at minimal expense. The political support for maintaining a large standing Army in peacetime is dependent on the check and balance provided by continued support for a strong National Guard.
5
It must be recognized that a starting point for any realistic discussion about the present rift between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard is that inherent tension is necessary for an effective system of checks and balances. When the system works as it should, the Regular Army and the Army National Guard should be perpetually locked in a healthy competitive interchange of roles and responsibilities. Danger arises from those who would disrupt the balance by moving too far toward either extreme: i.e., towards assimilation, 6 or in an effort to promote partnership and prevent assimilation, permitting the tensions to degenerate into self-destructive conduct. What each of these subordinate leaders did, in fact, was to turn to their staff support to identify appropriate substantive steps. The respective staffs undertook to "obey" by using the time proven method for military decisionmaking, "staffing". Staffing an issue leads to identifying the problem and coming up with one to three options for resolution. The staff analyzes the options and recommends a course of action in the staff brief to the senior leader.
Unfortunately, staffing has not only failed to identify the means to resolve the rift, but is an aggravating factor.
Staffing is a captive process defined within the existing structure and fully incorporates the culture of the Regular recommendation from the Regular Army was to solve the problem by total assimilation, the elimination of the Army National Guard. 12 The staffing process in the National Guard
Bureau focused on the equal partnership interpretation and provided a more complex recommendation, but one that was unacceptable to the Regular Army.
The National Guard Bureau staff developed a proposal to give the Army and Air National Guard components representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff through elevating to four star General status, the Chief, National
Guard Bureau.
13
The National Guard Bureau argued that it should have decisive impute into decisions affecting Army National Guard operations and force structure. However, the force structure of the Army National Guard is mandated by the structural requirements of the federal mission as determined by the Regular Army at its decision-making tables. The National Guard Bureau long ago sought to mandate the right to participate in the decision-making processes.
14 Now the National Guard Bureau's solution was to gain for itself the rank and positions for it to have seats at these .decision-making tables.
On the other hand, the Regular Army considers the Army military personnel subject to discipline, the option of directly using the public forum for accusations of dishonesty against the leadership of the other component.
The level of animosity is now at a fever pitch festering 6 just below the public's view.
In part, because of the rift between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard over the Quadrennial Defense
Review, Congress impaneled its own review committee, the National Defense Panel. In December 1997, the National Defense Panel Report was released and contained a bombshell:
"While the other services have continued to increase the integration of their active and reserve forces, the Army has suffered from destructive disunity among its components, specifically between the active Army and the National Guard. This rift serves neither the Army nor the country well. The Panel strongly believes the rift must be healed." WHAT is it that we are talking about? We are talking about the rift between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard. Money, downsizing, honesty issues, and misunderstandings are symptoms, not the causes of the rift. Bureau of being too conscious of protecting its own "turf".
The system is structured so that National Guard Bureau is too frequently placed in a "no win" situation.
System analysis suggests that the National Guard structures mismatch with the structures of the active Army. Morale, retention, and recruitment will increasingly be adversely affected. Congressional support will lessen, making it more difficult to balance resources. As the Army's ability to perform missions becomes more suspect the other services will take over more and more of the historic Army Whatever may be the wishes of those that desire otherwise, the fact of the rift cannot be altered. The facts must be hunted down, gathered, and evaluated. This is a difficult task and one that cannot be done without offense to someone. Once this is done then a truly Total Force senior leadership can effectively lead rather than manage. To do this requires clearly understood decisions. General (retired) John R.
Galvin recently wrote, "The decision has to come from the top and be unambiguous. This has not happened. Then, the follow-up has to hammer this home". 41 PRINCIPLES. Ethical principles all stem from equality.
People should be treated' fairly and equally "The American 23
people rightly look to their military leaders not only to be skilled in the technical aspects of the profession of arms, but to be men of integrity". Commanders' table (a most important decision making table) and in keeping with the Guard's historic combat missions and joint structure with the Air National Guard.
b. The National Guard would have an organizational structure and a rank structure that coincides with the active Army organizational structure and rank structure. 25
c. The mission of Homeland Defense requires a national command structure. The Homeland Defense Command should be a joint command. The National Guard is already a joint command comprised of Air National Guard and Army National Guard resources. Other Army components and Services should be integrated into the Homeland Defense Command. 45 d. The National Guard has a successful track record with multi-state commanders (most ARNG Divisions are multistate) . The National Guard has already made significant progress coordinating domestic assistance through interstate compacts. 46 e. This can be done promptly and should receive strong civilian support. It has a strong probability of success and is reasonably proportional to the problems it addresses. Army means all three components of the Army, the Regular Army ("active" no longer seems applicable now that the reserves are "active"), the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. 3 See George Washington, Washington's "Sentiments On A Peace Establishment" (From Washington's Barrack Book), 1783," Alto' a large standing Army in time of Peace hath ever been considered dangerous to the liberties of a Country, yet a few Troops, under certain circumstances, are not only safe, but indispensably necessary" (p. 376). 4 The Regular Army defines Total Army readiness by "first to fight" external threats to the united States. The National Guard's additional mission of "first to serve" the civilian population in times of natural disaster, civil unrest, and now terrorist threat from inside as well as abroad is not perceived to be by the Regular Army leadership an equivalent "readiness" issue. See John G. Roos, "View From the Top, Army p.41. 21 Ibid., p. 65. 22 The anecdotal stories are multitudinous. The continued questioning of the motives for post mobilization training for the three National Guard Round Out Brigades of three active Army divisions during the Gulf War are illustrative. See, Major General (ARNG-Ret.) Robert F. Ensslin, "The Army's Civil War, The National Guard Cries Out For an Army Leader With the Vision to Recognize a National Treasure," Armed Forces Journal (September 1997), p.67. 23 Dr. Mark Foley, Chief, Personnel Actions Office, Guard & Reserve Affairs, Office of The Judge Advocate General, Army, stated, "If this is truly kairos, not a logical evolution -a chronos, then the steps should be bold -seize the moment, which may not return for decades." 24 Ibid., Haakenson, "There is a difference between being invited to sit at the table and being a participant." 25 Interview with Major General Keith D. Bjerke, Adjutant General North Dakota National Guard, discussed the First Air Force, that has an Air National Guard Commander illustrative of the integrated culture in the Air Force. 26 In an interview with Major General (retired) Keith E. Nelson, former The Judge Advocate General, Air Force, he stated the Air Force developed an integrated partnership through a model for shared learning and because "each component is dependent on missions performed by the other components within the Air Force." 27 In an interview with Major General Robert E. Schulte, ARNG, Deputy commanding General, Fifth Army, he stated that the effectiveness of such an advisor would be "dependent on knowledge, personality, and whether he can be there when the right meetings were going on." 28 United States Code Title 10 Section 3015. 29 See, Ronald S. Hunter, Gary L. Smith, and Debra M. Gordan, Editors, National Guard Almanac, Uniformed Services Almanac, Inc., Falls Church, VA, 1996, p.99. 30 Major General Robert E. Schulte in the interview stated, "The National Guard needs to resolve National Guard command and control." 31 Compare the Army structure with the Air Force. The First Air Force is lead by an Air National Guard Commander and has the same structure as other major commands within the Air Force. 32 Ibid., George Washington, Washington's "Sentiments On a Peace Establishment", see "I come next in the order I have prescribed myself, to treat of the Arrangements necessary for placing the Militia of the Continent on a respectable footing for the defence of the Empire and in speaking of this Bulwark of our Liberties and independence..." p. 387. 33 Report of the National Defense Panel December 1997, "Transforming Defense National Security in the 21st Century", p.73. 34 Interview with Major General (ND State Active Duty for Red River Flood Relief) Murray G. Sagsveen, and formerly ARNG Special Assistant to The Judge Advocate General, Army (1993-96) . General Sagsveen stated, "Unfortunately, the process now used tends to attribute problems to personality disputes requiring neither examination of the causes nor substantive steps to find solutions. It is one step forward two step back process." 35 
